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The pressurized water reactor CAP1400 is one of the sixteen National Science and Technology Major 
Projects. Developed from China’s nuclear R&D system and manufacturing capability, as well as AP1000 
technology introduction and assimilation, CAP1400 is an advanced large passive nuclear power plant 
with independent intellectual property rights. By discussing the top design principle, main performance 
objectives, general parameters, safety design, and important improvements in safety, economy, and oth-
er advanced features, this paper reveals the technology innovation and competitiveness of CAP1400 as 
an internationally promising Gen-III PWR model. Moreover, the R&D of CAP1400 has greatly promoted 
China’s domestic nuclear power industry from the Gen-II to the Gen-III level.
© 2016 THE AUTHORS. Published by Elsevier LTD on behalf of Chinese Academy of Engineering and 
Higher Education Press Limited Company. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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1.  Introduction
Engineering and societal developments, as well as an em-
phasis on nuclear safety, have continuously propelled nuclear 
technology forward, from Gen-II to Gen-III. The three historical 
commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents (Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima) have promoted higher safety 
standards on inherited safety and probabilistic safety objectives, 
stricter requirements for the prevention and mitigation of severe 
accidents, and the implementation of the passive safety concept. 
Operational experiences and industrial capability improvements 
have brought technologies with longer lifetimes, higher burnup, 
higher reliability, higher availability, modularization and stand-
ardization, design simplification, and digital instrumentation and 
control (I&C) systems into NPPs. Concerns regarding public ac-
ceptance and environmental impact have elevated requirements 
for the environmental compatibility of NPPs, including the prin-
ciple of “as low as reasonably achievable” (ALARA) for radiation 
protection and more stringent radwaste discharge standards. In 
1990, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) first published 
the Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Document 
(URD) [1], which defined the basic features and minimum re-
quirements for Gen-III nuclear power technologies through 14 
key policy statements. Since then, Gen-III nuclear technologies—
claimed to be safer, more economic, and more advanced—have 
become the mainstream of the nuclear power industry.
This paper focuses on the R&D of CAP1400, the largest Gen-
III passive pressurized water reactor (PWR), including its top-tier 
design principles, main performance objectives, general param-
eters, safety design considerations, and independent design and 
manufacturing of key equipment; as well as on the improvements 
in domestic nuclear design and manufacturing capability that 
have been motivated by the implementation of the passive PWR 
series for the National Science and Technology Major Project.
2.  General design and safety design
2.1.  General design of CAP1400
Ensuring its advanced nature from the very beginning, 
CAP1400 comprehensively inherits the philosophy of the passive 
concept and the simplification of AP1000 [2,3]; follows the latest 
effective codes, regulations, and standards at home and abroad; 
complies with the technology requirements defined in the URD 
and other documents for Gen-III NPPs; and fully incorporates the 
design changes and improvements from the AP1000 units under 
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construction both in China and abroad.
CAP1400 was developed by upgrading the power capacity 
level, optimizing the general parameters, balancing the entire 
plant design, redesigning the safety systems and key equipment, 
increasing the equipment localization proportion, actively re-
sponding to post-Fukushima safety policies issued by regulators 
at home and abroad, fulfilling the current highest safety goals, 
satisfying the most stringent radwaste discharge standards, and 
further improving the economic competitiveness. The general 
performance of CAP1400 reaches the world’s leading level of Gen-
III technology, as shown in Table 1.
Fig. 1 shows the configuration of the reactor coolant system. 
CAP1400 has two primary coolant loops that transfer the heat 
generated by the fission reaction of 235U in the reactor core to the 
steam generator (SG). Each loop consists of a hot leg, two cold 
legs, one SG, and two canned pumps. CAP1400 has one pressuriz-
er (PRZ) connected to one of the hot legs by a surge line.
CAP1400 has a compact and reasonable general layout, as 
shown in Fig. 2. It covers an area of only 0.164 m2·kW–1, which is 
less than that of traditional Gen-II+ plants and AP1000. The es-
timated cost of the first CAP1400 project, located in Rongcheng 
City, Shandong Province, is about 16 000 CNY·kW–1 ($2443 USD· 
kW–1), which is quite competitive among the Gen-III NPPs. For 
the Nth of its kind, the cost of CAP1400 is expected to be much 
lower due to the learning effect, as well as to design solidification, 
equipment and material localization, matured modularity, and 
optimized project management.
2.2.  Safety design of CAP1400
The safety design of CAP1400 is a multi-level combination of 
active defense-in-depth systems and passive engineered safe-
ty features, and incorporates systematic measures for severe 
accident prevention and mitigation. In addition, 21 tests were 
conducted to validate the design reasonability and software ap-
plicability, including: an advanced core-cooling mechanism ex-
periment (ACME), a containment safety verification via integral 
test (CERT), and a critical in-vessel retention (IVR) heat flux test. 
Non-safety-grade active facilities, including a normal residual 
heat-removal system (RNS), a component cooling system (CCS), 
a service water system (SWS), and others, are defense-in-depth 
measures. These facilities remove the core heat under anticipated 
transients, which avoids unnecessary actuation of the passive sys-
tems and prevents the transients from deteriorating to accidents. 
Based on lessons learned from the Fukushima accident [4] and 
related regulator policies [5], several safety enhancements were 
carried out to strengthen these defense-in-depth facilities. First, 
the seismic resistance capability of the normal decay heat remov-
al facilities (as called the “cooling chain”) was strengthened. Sec-
ond, in order to further ensure the functioning of the decay heat 
removal path for the core and spent fuel 72 h after an accident 
initiation, seismic-resistant water source interfaces and portable 
diesel pumps were installed, and the designs of the emergency 
water source and power source were strengthened. For example, 
the emergency power was stored in a specific building [6].
The engineered safety systems of CAP1400 include a passive 
residual heat-removal system, a passive safety injection system, 
an automatic depressurization system, a passive containment 
cooling system, and so forth. These safety-grade passive facilities 
were designed to remove the heat from the reactor and contain-
ment under accident conditions, and to implement the emergen-
cy core cooling injection in order to prevent the core from melt-
ing down and ensure that radioactive substances remain confined 
within the containment. These passive systems, which comply 
with “single-failure” and “fail-safe” criteria, are triggered passive-
ly; that is, without relying on on-site/off-site AC power or other 
active equipment. They perform their intended function without 
an operator’s control or external assistance within 72 h of an acci-
dent initiation.
The passive safety injection system provides emergency core 
makeup water and high-concentration boron water under acci-
dent conditions such as those caused by a main steam pipeline 
rupture, and provides core safety injection during a loss-of-coolant 
accident (LOCA). The system includes high-pressure injection (by 
Table 1
Performance objectives and main parameters of CAP1400.
Parameter Unit Value
Core rated power MWt 4040
Electric power output MWe ~1500, depends on site condition
Design lifetime years 60
Availability 93%
Construction duration month ≤ 56 for first, 48 for fleet
Operator action time h 72 (7 days with some water supply operation)
Core damage frequency (CDF) per reactor year 4.02 × 10–7
Large release frequency (LRF) per reactor year 5.07 × 10–8
Collective occupational exposure person Sv·(reactor year)–1 < 1
Individual occupational exposure mSv·(reactor year)–1 < 20 
Waste disposal standard < 1000 Bq·L–1 for coastal site, < 100 Bq·L–1 for inland site, and packaged solid waste  
volume < 50 m3·a–1
Safety shutdown earthquake Safety shutdown earthquake (SSE) 0.3g (g, gravitation contant); seismic capability 0.5g
Core design margin ≥15%
Fuel type RFA modified or self-developed
No. of fuel assemblies 193
Refueling interval month 18
Averaged discharge fuel burnup MWd·(tU)
–1 ≥ 50 000
Mixed oxide fuel-loading capacity Yes
Average linear power density W·cm–1 181.0
Coolant average temperature °C 304.0
System operation pressure MPa(a) 15.5
Reactor coolant pump (RCP) Domestic canned motor pump or wet-winding motor pump
RCP flow rate m3·h–1 21 642
Steam pressure at steam generator (SG) exit MPa(a) 6.01
Steam flow per SG kg·s–1 1123.4
Steal containment design pressure MPa 0.443, 10% margin
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core makeup tank, CMT), intermediate pressure injection (by ac-
cumulator, ACC), low-pressure injection (by in-containment refu-
eling water storage tank, IRWST), and long-term core flooding (by 
pit and recirculation of IRWST). Compared with those of AP1000, 
the CMT volume of CAP1400 is increased by 21% according to the 
reactor core power uprate ratio, the ACC volume is increased by 
38% to meet the fast core flooding requirement during a LOCA, 
the IRWST volume is increased by 34% to meet the pit flooding 
level requirement, and the nominal diameter of the direct ves-
sel injection (DVI) line is increased from DN200 (in AP1000) to 
DN250 (in CAP1400) to meet the injection flow requirement at a 
higher power level. These designs have been validated by system-
atic tests. Fig. 3 shows the test result and the software prediction 
of the core collapsed level during a double-ended direct vessel 
injection (DEDVI) line break accident. During such accidents, the 
core (collapsed) water level should be precisely predicted for 
safety analysis since it indicates whether or not the core is still 
submerged in water. 
The automatic depressurization system (ADS) functions to 
depressurize the reactor coolant system (RCS) during an accident 
so as to enable the safety injection and avoid core meltdown at 
high pressure. The first, second, and third stage valves function 
to provide early stage depressurization for the ACC injection (as 
well as for RNS commissioning), and their nominal diameters are 
all 50 mm larger than those of AP1000. The fourth stage valves 
function to provide final stage depressurization for the IRWST 
injection. In order to activate the gravitational injection as early 
as possible and satisfy the flow-rate requirement, their nominal 
diameters were expanded from DN350 (in AP1000) to DN450 (in 
CAP1400), with the discharge capacity increased by 60%.
The passive containment cooling system (PCS) removes the 
heat from the steel containment by water spray at the outer sur-
face; the water flows down by gravity from a water storage tank 
Fig. 1.  The CAP1400 reactor coolant system configuration.
Fig. 2.  General layout of CAP1400. Fig. 3. Test result vs. software prediction of core collapsed level during DEDVI. 
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installed on top of the shield building. The containment vessel 
was re-designed with a larger capacity to better confine the en-
ergy and mass release during an accident. By optimizing the con-
tainment wall thickness, the pressure-bearing capability of the 
steel containment was strengthened and the safety margin was 
enhanced. The elevated water storage tank can provide at least 
72 h of continuous water flow without operator intervention. 
After 72 h from the accident initiation, the spray line can switch 
the suction interface to a recirculation pipeline, which is driven 
by active systems. As a demonstration of the CERT, Fig. 4 shows 
the containment pressure variation with time during large LOCAs 
from test and analysis (two test conditions). The in-containment 
pressure is a crucial parameter for containment cooling during 
LOCAs since it is closely related to the intactness and radioactive 
substance confinement capability of the containment. 
The spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling system was also improved. 
In addition to conventional water level monitoring and spent fuel 
cooling facilities, a pool spraying sub-system and an emergency 
water supply pipeline were installed to ensure the cooling of 
spent fuels under postulated accident conditions [6].
In the case of a severe accident, the following countermeasures 
would be initiated: In the early stages of the accident, the ADS 
would function to depressurize the RCS to avoid core meltdown 
at high-pressure conditions. If the core melted, the IVR measure 
would be activated to prevent molten debris from relocating 
to the containment and causing further ex-vessel severe acci-
dent phenomena such as ex-vessel steam explosion and molten 
core-concrete interaction. Compared to AP1000, CAP1400 has an 
additional six passive hydrogen re-combiners inside its contain-
ment, and its power supply window for the hydrogen igniter has 
been prolonged. In addition, the seismic resistance capability of 
the hydrogen monitoring instruments and 66 hydrogen igniters 
was strengthened to ensure their availability in the case of an 
earthquake. The probability and hazards of the containment by-
pass were minimized by preventing the interfacing system LOCA 
and SG from overfilling due to heat transfer tube rupture acci-
dents. Containment failure at a late stage could be prevented by 
removing the heat inside the containment by means of the PCS 
and implementing controllable containment venting measures.
According to the URD requirement, the core damage frequency 
(CDF) and the large release frequency (LRF) for Gen-III NPPs are 
CDF < 1.0 × 10–5 and LRF < 1.0 × 10–6. These are the same as the 
requirements for units to be constructed in China. For the passive 
PWR CAP1400, the CDF and LRF are 4.02 × 10–7 and 5.07 × 10–8, 
respectively, which are lower than the URD and domestic require-
ments. Moreover, severe accident scenarios that required an off-
site emergency plan have been eliminated, which technically 
complies with the principle of no emergency evacuation. It can 
be found that CAP1400 is an advanced Gen-III NPP with superior 
safety performance.
3.  Innovations in operation, equipment, and material
In addition to the safety margin enhancement and safety 
design improvements, innovations or improvements were also 
made in the reactor core, reactor pressure vessel (RPV), reactor 
internals, primary and main steam pipes, SG, waste treatment 
process, steam turbine process, I&C systems, plant anti-flooding 
layout, shielding building structure, modular design and con-
struction, and so forth.
(1) An advanced fuel management strategy was applied that 
includes, for example, taking the low neutron leakage 
fuel load from the first cycle and thereby improving the 
neutron economy. Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel-loading ca-
pability is provided [7]. The load-following mechanism 
was strengthened by using mechanical shim core control, 
which equips the plant with stronger operational flexibil-
ity and reduces the boron water discharge during normal 
operation. Fig. 5 shows the core loading pattern and con-
trol rod assembly arrangement. The outmost assemblies 
use fuels with enrichments of 0.74 weight/percent (w/o) 
and 2.86 w/o, representing a low leakage loading pattern. 
Control rod assemblies consist of 41 regulation bundles 
(of rods) and 48 shutdown bundles; among the regulation 
bundles, MA–MD are gray rods (less poisonous) while 
M1/M2/AO are black rods. 
(2) Equipment and components were optimized in the de-
sign in order to improve performance and reliability. The 
forging capability of equipment manufacturing was en-
hanced, and welding seams on the primary system were 
significantly reduced to ensure the integrity of the prima-
ry system and to simplify the in-service inspection. The 
main coolant pipes and the upper head of the RPV were 
integrally forged.
(3) The neutron shielding pad was eliminated, in contrast 
to that of AP1000; this reduces the occurrence of loose 
parts. In the lower plenum, a dismountable even-flow dis-
tributor was placed instead of a conventional flow skirt, 
optimizing the flow distribution into the core. In addition, 
the internal mass of the reactor was increased to facilitate 
the implementation of IVR and to enhance the ability to 
resist flow-induced vibration.
(4) The primary coolant pipes and the main steam pipes were 
optimized to reduce the flow velocity, with satisfying 
performance requirements as a prerequisite. This design 
alleviates flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC) in the process 
of long-term operation and enhances operation safety.
(5) A new SG model was developed and equipped in CAP1400 
with a heat transfer area increased by 27% (compared 
with that of AP1000), which reduces primary loop re-
sistance and improves secondary side performance. Test- 
validated steam separators, consisting of 146 primary 
separators and 8 group dryers (double hook plate), were 
installed in the SG; these are beneficial for higher steam 
quality.
(6) The plant is designed to control the production of liquid 
radwaste from potential sources, including equipment, 
material, and operation mode. Advanced radwaste treat-
ment technologies were also applied. For example, the 
liquid radwaste system (WLS) was equipped with an ion 
exchange sequence and a chemical coagulation process to Fig. 4.  Containment pressure from test and analysis during large break LOCAs. 
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lower the concentration of discharged radioactive liquid 
waste below 1000 Bq·L–1 for coastal sites and 100 Bq·L–1 
for inland sites. In addition, the ventilation system was 
equipped with an iodine filter. All efforts were made to 
minimize the total amount of waste gas, waste liquid, and 
waste solid. Interfaces were provided to deal with future 
stricter environmental protection requirements.
(7) A self-developed long blade (the final grade blade is 1.828 m 
long) with a larger exhaust area was installed in the tur-
bine to improve the turbo-generator efficiency; cold-end 
optimization of the turbine-generator was adopted to fur-
ther optimize the plant heat efficiency.
(8) Integral I&C systems were adopted and human-factor 
engineering (HFE) was fully considered in designing the 
main control room. Moreover, the availability and per-
formability of the main control room were enhanced and 
the human-machine interface was improved [6].
(9) A “dry” site design was adopted; a movable flashboard 
was installed between the auxiliary building and the 1E 
class battery compartment, which is located at a higher 
ground level to protect the plant from internal and exter-
nal flooding.
(10) A steel-plate concrete structure was adopted for the 
shield building, which strengthens its resistance to a larg-
er commercial airplane crash [8].
(11) Modular design and construction was applied to shorten 
construction duration and reduce total cost. It reduces the 
workload for on-site construction assembly, and facili-
tates production, transportation, and installation.
(12) After R&D of key equipment and bulk materials, these are 
now basically domestically supplied, including the heat 
transfer tubes of the SG and the welding materials (locali-
zation rate above 85%); this greatly reduces the plant con-
struction cost. The localization of key equipment also lays 
a solid foundation for the fleet construction of CAP1400, 
and reduces the project schedule risk.
(13) HFE and the reliability design concept were made full use 
of in order to achieve high reliability of the power plant 
with low maintenance. The maintainability and accessi-
bility were adequately considered [6]. The reliability al-
location and design are to be carried out further, and the 
plant online safety and performance monitoring systems 
are under development; these measures will further im-
prove the real safety of the plant.
4.  Summary and future prospect
This paper has comprehensively discussed the general design 
approach, main performance objectives and parameters, safety 
design considerations, and important technology innovations of 
CAP1400 development. In terms of safety, economy, and other 
performance features, CAP1400 satisfies the Gen-III requirements. 
The research and design of CAP1400 has propelled the transfor-
mation of domestic nuclear design, testing, and equipment man-
ufacturing capability from Gen-II to Gen-III.
In the future, improvements of the PWR lie in the following 
aspects: From the perspective of safety, it is necessary to identify 
equipment and instruments that bring the plant back to a stable 
and controllable state, according to the severe accident manage-
ment guidelines (SAMGs). It is also necessary to demonstrate 
that the equipment and instruments can perform their intended 
functions under severe accident conditions with a reasonable 
level of confidence. From an economic point of view, it is valuable 
to enhance the simplification and standardization philosophy 
and to promptly incorporate feedback from the demonstration 
projects of Gen-III plants to follow-up units, so as to improve the 
constructability and modularity, shorten the construction dura-
tion, and ensure that the fleet construction cost is significantly 
reduced. From the perspective of operation and maintenance, it 
is indispensable to strengthen the load-following capability in 
consideration of the increase of the installed capacity of domestic 
nuclear power, and to facilitate intelligent equipment monitoring 
and performance diagnoses, which give strong support for main-
tenance optimization as well as for other plant activities.
As a large-scale advanced PWR design integrating innovation 
and re-innovation with independent intellectual property rights, 
CAP1400 has superior safety and economic advantages and a 
broad market prospect. It will strongly support China’s nuclear 
power development in a safe and efficient manner and facilitate 
the implementation of the “go global” strategy.
Fig. 5.  (a) Core loading pattern of the first cycle; (b) control rod assembly arrangement.
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Nomenclature
ACC accumulator
ACME advanced core-cooling mechanism experiment 
ADS automatic depressurization system
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
CCS component cooling system
CDF core damage frequency
CERT containment safety verification via integral test 
CMT core makeup tank
DEDVI double-ended direct vessel injection
DVI direct vessel injection
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute
FAC flow-accelerated corrosion
HFE human-factor engineering
I&C instrumentation and control
IRWST in-containment refueling water storage tank
IVR in-vessel retention
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident
LRF large release frequency
MOX mixed oxide (fuel)
NPP nuclear power plant
PCS passive containment cooling system
PRZ pressurizer
PWR pressurized water reactor
RCP reactor coolant pump
RCS reactor coolant system
RPV reactor pressure vessel
RNS normal residual heat-removal system
SAMG severe accident management guidelines
SFP spent fuel pool 
SG steam generator
SWS service water system
URD Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements Doc-
ument
WLS liquid radwaste system
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